Category Archives: Real Estate

Was Alleged Oral Modification of Contract of Sale Barred By the Statue of Frauds?

By written contract dated December 10, 2008, Alan Gestetner agreed to purchase and New York Golf Enterprises, Inc. agreed to sell 9.29 acres of property located in New Hempstead for the purchase price of $3,460,000. At the time the contract was entered into, the 9.29 acres were part of an undivided tax lot totaling approximately 160 acres on which NYGE operated a golf course. The contract called for the payment of $250,000 upon signing and an additional down payment of $750,000 due upon subdivision approval. It was undisputed that Gestetner did not tender payment of either the initial $250,000 down payment or the additional $750,000 down payment. It was also undisputed that on December 15, 2008, and again on December 19, 2008, nonparty Cheon Cho, who executed the contract as the president of NYGE, accepted two payments from Gestetner, each in the amount of $25,000.

Were Defenses of Life Estate and Constructive Trust Barred As A Matter of Law?

Kenneth Rosenblum brought a license holdover proceeding against Diana Treitler and Bruce Treitler seeking possession of apartment 15 at 42 Bank Street. The Treitlers answered and asserted several affirmative defenses.

The third affirmative defense:

That Respondent Diana Treitler who is the sister of the Petitioner has been granted the equivalent of a Life Estate to occupy the subject premises by the Petitioner who promised her the apartment for as long as she wanted. Said Life Estate was granted in or about 2011 and the Respondent has been in possession of the subject apartment since said date. Respondent Diana Treitler has unequivocally relied upon the representation of Petitioner who said that he was giving the subject apartment to said Respondent for as long as she wanted. Respondent in reliance has taken possession of the subject apartment and made improvements thereto. Thus, pursuant to Promissory Estoppel and detrimental reliance, the Petitioner is estopped from denying Respondent’s right of possession to the subject apartment.

Were Two Real Estate  Deeds Authorized/Prohibited Under the POA?

In October 2016, Mustafa Choudari executed a deed purporting to convey title to property located at 1474 Broadway in Brooklyn from Mohammad Choudari, his brother, to Mohammad and Mustafa, jointly. In February 2017, Mohammad commenced an action, pursuant to RPAPL article 15 against Mustafa to quiet title to that property, alleging that Mustafa forged his name on the October 2016 deed.

In March 2017, Mustafa executed a second deed purporting to convey title to property located at 1472 Broadway in Brooklyn from Mohammad to Mohammad and Mustafa, jointly. In June 2017, Mohammad commenced another action to quiet title to that second property, alleging that the March 2017 deed was also forged. Mustafa asserted counterclaims, alleging, in effect, that the properties were purchased as part of a joint venture agreement between the brothers. The actions were subsequently consolidated.

Were Broker/Carrier Liable for Underinsurance?

Kim Clark’s home was damaged by a fire.  Clark failed to advise her insurance agent or broker about an addition to her home which increased its square footage by approximately fifty percent. As a result of the fire, Clark claimed losses to her home and personal property far exceeded her insurance coverage limits which did not account for the unknown increased square footage of the renovated home.

Clark filed suit seeking damages against Urbanski Insurance Agency, Inc.  alleging it negligently procured insufficient insurance coverage for the home and against Preferred Mutual Insurance Company claiming it was vicariously liable for Urbanski’s alleged negligence.

Court Decides If Doctrine Of Practical Location Was Dispositive of Neighbors’ Border Dispute

Robert Czenszak and others commenced an action to quiet title and for declaratory relief against Anthony Iasello and Catherine Iasello. Czenszak aleged that a cinder block wall forms the boundary line between the parties’ adjoining properties under the doctrine of practical location and that a strip of land that lies between the cinder block wall boundary line and the boundary line set forth in the respective deeds to the adjoining properties—which is a small triangular strip of land measuring approximately 4.2 feet at its widest point—was owned by the Czenszak.

The Iasellos asserted a counterclaim for a judgment declaring that the boundary line between the adjoining properties was as described in the respective deeds and that they owned the disputed strip. They moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and on their counterclaim.  Supreme Court searched the record and, under the doctrine of practical location, awarded summary judgment to Czenszak, declaring that he owned the disputed property. The Iasellos appealed.