Did Owner Conceal– or Rider Assume—the Horseback Riding Risk?
Jesse Stanhope sued Alexander Conway on theories of negligence and strict liability seeking to recover for injuries allegedly sustained when he was “bucked” off a horse named “Blaze” and owned by Conway.
Following joinder of issue and discovery, Conway moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint contending that Stanhope assumed the risks inherit in horseback riding. Stanhope opposed the motion. And Supreme Court denied the motion, finding outstanding questions of fact regarding whether the specific horse posed risks that were above and beyond those known by Stanhope.
Conway appealed and, during the pendency of the appeal, passed away. His significant other, Michelle Burke, was appointed as the temporary administrator of Conway’s estate and substituted as defendant in the action.
Pursuant to the primary assumption of risk doctrine, participants in a sporting event or activity, such as horseback riding, may be held to have consented to those injury-causing events which are known, apparent or reasonably foreseeable. But participants are not deemed to assume the risks of conditions caused by the defendant’s negligence that were unique and created a dangerous condition over and above the usual dangers that were inherent in the sport.
The applicability of the assumption of risk doctrine generally presents a question of fact that considers the participant’s knowledge of the dangerous condition and consequent risk against the background of his or her skill and experience. However, some risks are so perfectly obvious that even a relatively inexperienced participant should be charged with knowledge of them, simply because they inhere in the sporting activity so far as they are obvious and necessary. Horseback riding involves inherent risks, including a horse making sudden movements that may cause a rider to be thrown or to fall off the horse.
Burke made a motion for summary judgment and proffered Conway’s pre-demise affidavit, as well as excerpts of Stanhopes deposition testimony and that of two nonparty witnesses who were Conway’s tenants at the time of Stanhope’s fall.
According to Conway’s affidavit, he purchased the horse, Blaze, around April 2018 and learned that the horse was “green broke” — meaning it was experienced wearing a saddle and having weight on its back but required further training. In the months that followed, Conway’s tenants worked with Blaze; one tenant used various tools to desensitize Blaze to surprising sounds and sights, while the other rode Blaze and monitored Conway’s minor children when they rode Blaze. Stanhope was privy to at least some of that training –and admitted that, in the months preceding the incident, he groomed, brushed and walked Blaze three to four times per week. During that time, he never observed Blaze engage in any aggressive behavior.
Stanhope explained that, prior to Blaze, he had ridden various horses approximately 50 or 60 times. On July 2, 2018, he first rode Blaze, and he did so for approximately 20 minutes without incident. Then, on July 4, 2018, after riding Blaze for about 10 seconds, Stanhope explained that the horse suddenly stopped, causing him to be thrown from the horse and to suffer an injury to his wrist.
The evidence submitted in support of Burke’s motion established that Stanhope had significant exposure to horses such that he could appreciate the inherent risks involved in horseback riding. Further, although the parties referred to Blaze as a “green broke” horse who was undergoing further training, there was no evidence that Conway concealed such information from Stanhope, or that Conway otherwise increased or concealed the risks associated with riding Blaze. Indeed, Stanhope admitted that, for months, he had been personally involved in caring for Blaze, and the evidence showed that he was well acquainted with the horse. As such, Burke met the initial burden of establishing that Stanhope assumed the risks involved in horseback riding, negating Conway’s liability– and the burden shifted to Stanhope to establish the existence of material questions of fact.
In opposition to the motion, Stanhope proffered his own affidavit as well as further excerpts of the same deposition transcripts submitted by Burke. One of Conway’s tenants testified that, on the day of the incident, he had directed Stanhope to ride in the direction of a pond on the property, but Stanhope instead caused the horse to trot in the opposite direction. Stanhope admitted that he rode in the direction opposite the pond. But argued that he was unaware that Blaze was a “green broke” horse and, as such, he could not have appreciated the risk involved in riding Blaze rather than a more seasoned horse.
However, Stanhope’s own admissions established that he was aware of at least some of the training that Blaze was undergoing, and that he was personally involved in grooming and walking the horse in the months preceding the incident. Considering Stanhope’s familiarity with Blaze and that a horse suddenly stopping is an inherent risk involved in horseback riding, no material questions of fact remained as to whether Conway had concealed any risks above and beyond those involved in horseback riding. Because Stanhope was deemed to have consented to the inherent risks involved in horseback riding, the primary assumption of risk doctrine shielded Burke (Conway) from liability.
So Supreme Court should have granted Burke’s motion and dismissed Stanhope’s complaint.