Did Complaint State Claim Against Sibling For Constructive Trust Over Mother’s Land?
Ruth Kissane and others sue Olga Cashman to impose a constructive trust on real property formerly owned by nonparty Margaret Cashman, the now-deceased mother of Ruth and Olga. The complaint alleged that, prior to Margaret’s death and while she was the owner of the property, Ruth and Ruth’s then husband advanced Margaret $600,000 for repairs to the property so that Margare could remain living there. And Olga advanced Margaret $400,000 for repairs.
Margaret then transferred the property to Olga and Olga’s then boyfriend for the purpose of obtaining a mortgage loan to repay a portion of the loan that had been given by Ruth. Olga was residing with Margaret as her primary caretaker at the time and held a power of attorney. The complaint further alleged that Olga promised Margaret and Ruth that she would sell the property upon Margaret’s death and repay the remainder of the loans to Ruth and herself, and that any remaining proceeds would then be distributed to Margaret’s children, in accordance with Margaret’s wishes. After obtaining a mortgage loan, Olga repaid $340,000 of the $600,000 loan from Ruth. And Olga’s then boyfriend transferred his interest in the property to Olga. But when Margaret died, Olga refused to honor her alleged promise. Needles to say, litigation ensued.
Olga moved to dismiss Ruth’s complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Supreme Court denied the motion. Olga appealed.
Generally, a constructive trust may be imposed when property has been acquired in such circumstances that the holder of the legal title may not in good conscience retain the beneficial interest. To obtain the remedy of a constructive trust, a plaintiff generally is required to demonstrate four factors: (1) a fiduciary or confidential relationship between the parties, (2) a promise, (3) a transfer of some asset in reliance upon the promise, and (4) unjust enrichment flowing from the breach of the promise. Those elements serve only as guidelines, and a constructive trust may still be imposed wherever the required elements are substantially present or even if all four elements are not established. The remedy is given broad scope to respond to all human implications of the transaction and to satisfy the demands of justice.
Olga did not challenge on appeal whether the complaint adequately pleaded the elements of a promise, a transfer in reliance, and unjust enrichment. And contrary to Olga’s contention, the allegations in the complaint as to the parties’ familial relationship sufficiently pleaded the fiduciary or confidential relationship element to state a cause of action for the imposition of a constructive trust.
Accordingly, Supreme Court properly denied Olga’s motion to dismiss Ruth’s complaint.