Did Emergency Doctrine Excuse Driver From Liability for Injuries?
Alwin Martinez was injured in an incident when his vehicle became disabled on the highway and Yesenia Camacho drove to the scene to help him. Camacho testified that although she first parked behind Martinez on the shoulder, she eventually moved her vehicle so that it extended partially into the right-hand lane of the highway so that she could help jump start Martinez’s vehicle. While they were waiting for the vehicle to charge, a tractor-trailer leased by J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc. crashed into the back of Camacho’s vehicle, injuring both Martinez and Camacho. Litigation ensued..
Martinez and Camacho’s motion for summary judgment against Transport as to liability was granted. And Transport’s affirmative defense of comparative negligence was dismissed. Transport appealed.
Martinez and Camacho established entitlement to summary judgment on liability, as a rear-end collision with a stopped vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the driver of the rear vehicle. And Transport failed to provide an adequate nonnegligent explanation for the accident, as no party disputed that the tractor-trailer rear-ended Camacho’s stopped vehicle.
Furthermore, the emergency doctrine was inapplicable, since the driver of the tractor himself created the emergency. As the evidence in the record made clear, just before the collision, he was driving over the speed limit while talking on his cellphone. In addition, the dash cam video showed he had an unobstructed view of the roadway with no other traffic in the area and saw Camacho’s vehicle for at least 10 seconds before the impact, yet he made no attempt to stop, move to the left, or blow his horn.
Supreme Court correctly dismissed Transport’s affirmative defense with respect to Martinez’s comparative negligence, since the evidence showed that the disabled vehicle was parked on the right shoulder of the roadway, outside the flow of traffic. And the appellate court rejected Transport’s argument that Martinez’s call to Camacho for assistance constituted an intervening act that broke the chain of causation. Although the record showed that Camacho parked her vehicle partially in the rightmost lane of the highway, that Camacho may share some responsibility for the injuries did not absolve Transport from liability, as there may be more than one proximate cause of an injury .